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Abstract 
 
The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent 
offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a 
model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. 
Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the 
patent system is maximal for the patent offices that maximises either the social welfare or its own 
profit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent 
applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted 
patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy 
inappropriate objectives of patent office management. 
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1 Introduction
Over the past century patent o¢ ces have evolved to very large and heavy administrations. To put
some perspective, when the Venice republic passed the rst-known law on intellectual rights in 1474,
it organized a general welfare boardgathering some government o¢ cials and wise citizens to examine
the usefulness of the inventions for the city. Similarly, in the US, after the Congress passed the rst
US patent law in 1790, the patent applications were initially reviewed by Thomas Je¤erson who, at
the time, was the Secretary of State and a prolic inventor. Je¤erson simply passed the documents
of accepted innovations to the Secretary of War for review and then gathered the signatures from the
Attorney General and the President George Washington. Since then the rate of innovation and the
stock of knowledge have drastically increased worldwide. As a consequence, the patent examination
process requires large organizations, patent o¢ ces, with thousands of highly specialized professionals
who search and examine the inventions submitted by an ever increasing number of rms engaged
into industrial research and development, universities and independent inventors.1
For most economists, the central debate about patenting focuses on the protection of intellectual
property, where a balance must be found between dynamic e¢ ciency e¤ect (worth to the public) and
the static ine¢ ciency e¤ect (embarrassment) caused by the market power that patent systems grant
to innovating rms.2 However, the constant growth in patent lings and the consequent backlogs
(longer pendency during the examination process) have drawn the attention of many observers on
the nature and the cost of the examination process. In particular, it is questioned whether examiners
should spend less time on the examination of patent les and whether the resulting lower quality
and cost of the patent process is socially valuable. The question is of particular interest as two of
1To x ideas, the USPTO receives more than 400,000 patent applications each year (this number has dropped with
the crisis), of which a large percentage will be granted and potentially enforced. About 2 million patents are currently
in force in the US.
2Thomas Je¤erson (1794) penned perhaps one of the best-known maxims: Patents should draw a line between the
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not. Patents are,
after all, government-enforced monopolies and so there should be some embarrassment(and hesitation) in granting
them.
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the largest patent o¢ ces in the world, namely the US Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) and
the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), have adopted opposite strategies. In the former the examination
process is cheap and fast, with a low-to-medium relative quality of the examination process, whereas
in the latter the examination is slower and more expensive, with a medium-to-high quality. The
Japan Patent O¢ ce (JPO) is in an intermediate position (van Pottelsberghe, 2010). According to
Lemley (2001) the USPTO performs rationallya low quality examination, with too many patents
per examiners. The author argues that only limited resources should be allocated to the examination
process, because only a small share of patents are worth it economically. Indeed, the USPTO tackles
about three times more applications per year than the EPO, with approximately the same number
of examiners. However, more patents have been erroneously granted and fostered the perception of
a bad quality in the US patent system, as convincingly demonstrated by Ja¤e and Lerner (2004),
amongst others.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the governance of patent
o¢ ces (in terms of organization and resources) and the quality of patent systems. As a point of
departure one has to assume that the degree of quality in a patent system is important for patent
holders. As emphasized by Ayres and Klemperer (1999), a patent is best viewed as a probabilistic
property right that gives the patent holder the right to sue potential infringers and a fair chance
either to win the litigation in court or to reach a favorable agreement. So, it can fairly be assumed
that the quality of the patent selection process reduces the uncertainty associated with the e¤ective
exploitation of granted intellectual property rights. King (2003) indeed shows that the examination
hours spent on patent examination are statistically correlated with lower patent litigation activity. As
a result, more examination time potentially lowers the transaction costs associated with enforcement
of intellectual property rights. The present paper relies on this assumed positive relationship between
the degree of quality in a patent system and the level of certainty associated with the granted patent.
The paper puts forward a model where each invention is supposed to be associated with an
inherent and idiosyncratic uncertainty associated with the testing of the novelty condition with
respect to the prior art, and a su¢ cient degree of inventiveness, called the inventive step at the EPO
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and non-obviousness at the USPTO. Some inventions are obvious, others are not. So, even with a
comprehensive knowledge of prior art, e¤ort and time, an examiner faces the risk of wrongly granting
a patent; this risk is nevertheless smaller for "obvious" innovations. A high quality patent system
can therefore be dened as the one that discriminates between inventions keeping the same inherent
and idiosyncratic error risk. A medium quality patent system makes more errors and grants more
than necessarily monopolistic rights to applicants. A zero quality patent system would always grant
a patent and would simply consist in stamping and recording the patent application les.
Following King (2003), it can also be assumed that a better quality patent system is likely to be
taken more seriously at the litigation stage by the Court. If the patent o¢ ce o¤ers a zero patent
quality, the Court is unable to judge the true precedence and obviousness of a granted patent. The
court will give no advantage to a patent holder and the patent will have no or little legal value for
the latter. By contrast, if the patent o¢ ce o¤ers an excellent quality, the Court will more easily
uphold the patent in case of a validity challenge by infringers, and will more likely rule the litigation
in favor of the patent holder. In practice the link between quality of the patent system and patent
value is conrmed by the fact that US patent owners frequently ask for re-examination of previously
granted patents by the USPTO, in order to strengthen the certication o¤ered by the initial patent
and therefore increase the bargaining power during settlement or licensing negotiations. To sum up,
the quality of a patent system contributes to the credibility of the certication process and therefore
to the private value of patents and a¤ects the demand for patent rights by rms.
Finally, the production function of patent o¢ ces, and hence examinersbehavior, also need to be
formalized. In particular, it is assumed that the quality of the examination process is intrinsically
subject to uncertainty in the sense that the inventiveness and breadth of some innovations remain
impossible to assess with certainty. This is because the specication of a submitted patent may lie
between the specication of existing patents that have no direct connection together. As a result,
examiners cannot indenitely narrow down the error risk of granting a wrong patent.
Given the properties explained above, the paper explores the behavior of patent o¢ ces that can
set the fee and the quality of the examination process under budget neutrality. Patent o¢ ces can
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be managed under di¤erent objectives and contexts. This paper sequentially analyses o¢ ces run
by benevolent social planers and compare them with the o¢ ces managed by directors who follow
politician objectives such as increasing the number of patent applications or the number of granted
patents.3 The paper also considers the hypothetical case of o¢ ces with prot making objectives. The
results suggest that the quality levels are too low under politician structures but may be appropriate
in the monopoly setting. Finally, the paper analyzes the case of o¢ ces where politician directors
negotiate examiners working conditions with unions. In such a case the quality level can be closer
to the social optimum if unions have enough negotiation power. The presence of union reduces
the power of politician directors to favor quantity rather than quality of patents. Section 3 below
discusses the reality of those contexts and objectives.
Related Literature This paper focuses on the role of patent o¢ cesgovernance and organizational
structure in the setting up of quality in patent systems. In this respect, it departs substantially from
the mainstream patentliterature of the past 50 years. Early theoretical investigations into the role
of patent systems originated with Barzel (1968), Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1972), who argued
that stronger patent systems would induce more investment in research and development. Following
these early theoretical investigations, most landmark papers have essentially focused on three major
aspects of policy making: the optimal length, the optimal breadth (or the optimal combination of
these two dimensions), and the optimal geographical scope of protection. For instance, Gallini (1992)
analyses the optimal length of a patent as a function of imitation costs. Klemperer (1990) examines
the optimal scope of protection, whereas Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) identify the optimal mix between
length and breadth of patents. Scotchmer (1991) explores how patent scope may a¤ect the speed
of generation and di¤usion of new knowledge in a context of cumulative innovation processes. A
patent protection that is too strong could lead to socially ine¢ cient monopoly pricing and might
stie second-stage R&D. On the other hand, a too small inventive step could lead to hold-up
3For instance, the recently published intellectual property strategy of China has amongst its goals for 2015 a target
of 2 million yearly applications of patents, utility models and design rights (cf. the document published in November
2010 by the State Intellectual Property O¢ ce of China, quoted by Steve Lohr, New York Times, January 1st, 2011).
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problems, whereby a patent granted for a small increment would actually provide more power to
large resourceful imitators.
So far, however, it seems that the status-quo has prevailed in the examination eld, with little
noticeable changes since the landmark contribution of Penrose (1951) and Machlup (1960): "If we
did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing
it.4 Recent studies on the e¤ectiveness of patent systems seem to ourish, apparently in correlation
with the recent boom in patent applications and criticisms to it (Ja¤e and Lerner, 2004; Guellec
and van Pottelsberghe, 2007; Bessen and Meurer, 2008). The present paper takes an alternative 
and novel- approach to analyze the e¤ectiveness of patent systems and the degree of quality in the
examination process.
Few authors have discussed the optimal quality in patent systems. Lemley (2001) advocates for
low standards of patent examination on the ground of the rational ignorance principle. As the vast
majority of patented inventions do not lead to successful products in the market place, it may be
preferable to ignore them and wait for the small number of contentions in the product market and
organize their resolution in Court. This argument is contested by King (2003), who suggests that a
low quality examination would increase the uncertainty associated with the granted patents in case of
litigation. One of the few authors who explicitly consider patentability requirement is ODonoghue
(1998). His theoretical model suggests that more stringent selection criteria would create longer
incumbency and, thereby, would raise innovation incentives. Dewatripont and Legros (2008) show
that litigation threats contribute to reducing the propensity to le low-quality applications, while
they also hinder the production of strong patents. One method of reducing this negative side e¤ect
would be to sharpen the ltering process. Farrell and Shapiro (2008) also emphasize the importance
of ltering, as they nd that determining patent validity prior to licensing is socially benecial.
The present paper models the trade-o¤ between the cost of patenting and the uncertain benet of
4This quotation is often attributed to Machlup [1958, p. 80]. It however appears that Machlup was in fact quoting
Penrose [1951], according to Bronwyn Hall and Josh Lerner.
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the patented invention after the grant date. Caillaud and Duchêne (2005) and Langinier and Marcoul
(2003) consider the complexity and cost of information processing during the examination process,
which creates a social cost of granting bad patents. Their main concerns relate to the e¢ ciency
of equal treatmentof patent applications and to the possibility of bad equilibria in which patent
o¢ ces are attacked by rms that le ine¢ ciently high numbers of bad patent applications. Gans et
al. (2003) model the self-funded o¢ ces and compare their outcome to the social optimal one. None
of these papers discusses the impact of the objectives of patent o¢ ces governors and examiners, or
the role of governance, in the setting-up of the quality level in patent systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents new and original stylized facts about patent
o¢ ces that motivate our analysis. Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 discusses the demand
for patents. Section 4 studies the production of patents under various contexts and objectives.
Section 5 discusses unionized o¢ ces. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts about patent o¢ ces
This section presents stylized facts on di¤erences between the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce
(USPTO), the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), and the Japan Patent O¢ ce (JP0). The ve following
tables subsequently describe the demand for patents, the examination resources, the workload of
examiners, their incentives and the governance structure of patent o¢ ces. A rst stylized fact is that
there is a much higher propensity to le patents at the USPTO than at the two other o¢ ces. Table 1
displays the demand for monopolistic rights in the three o¢ ces, in both absolute and relative terms.
The demand can be measured either with the total number of patents led or with the number of
claims included in these patents. The latter indicator takes stock of the patent size in terms of claims,
which signicantly di¤ers across patent o¢ ces. The average patent led at the JPO includes about
9 claims, whereas a US patent includes up to 24 claims. In other words the average patent granted
by the USPTO provides a larger scope of protection than the average patent granted by the JPO.
With 448,000 applications in 2008 (nearly 11 million claims), the USPTO faces the largest number
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of lings. The demand for patents at the EPO is 51% of the demand at the USPTO (38% in terms of
claims). Although the JPO and USPTO le a similar number of patents (391 and 448), the number
of claims led in Japan falls to 33% of the U.S. level because of a smaller coverage of patents in
Japan. In other words, the demand for patent rights, as measured by the number of claims led,
is much higher at the USPTO than at the EPO or JPO, which both receive less than 40% of the
USPTO yearly workload.
EPO JPO USPTO EU/US JP/US
Patents led (000s) 227 391 448 0.51 0.87
Aver. number of claims per patent 18a 9 24 0.75 0.38
Total claims led (000s) 4,083 3,519 10,752 0.38 0.33
Patents led per 1000 capita 0.4 3.1 1.5 0.27 2.10
Claims led per 1000 capita 9 30 35 0.26 0.86
Claims in force per 1000 capita 13b 91 150 0.09 0.61
Table 1. Demand for monopolistic rights: patents and claims, 2008.5
As the EPO covers a much larger market than the USPTO or JPO, the demand per capita is
probably a better measure. It is the highest in the US and the smallest in Europe, Japan being
in an intermediate position (see the claims led per capita in Table 1). The consequence of the
heterogeneous propensities to rely on patent systems can also be gauged with the number of claims
5Comments for Table 1: a. The average number of claims for patent led at the EPO vary according to the type
of patent. PCT applications include much more claims (about 23 per patent), whereas the regional applications
(those for which the applicant wants the EPO to perform a substantive examination) include 15 claims on average.
For the sake of simplicity we rely on a number of 18 claims per patent led at the EPO.
b. The number of claims in force per 1000 capita in Europe is based on the total number of claims in force in Germany
(were more than 90% of the patents granted by the EPO are validated), relative to the EU population. Source:
national patent o¢ ces, trilateral statistical report and information provided by patent o¢ ces for the number of claims
(cf. de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2008). The number of capita comes from the OECD/MSTI database. The
number of patent in force is from WIPO statistical series (2009).
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in forceper capita in a geographical area, where then claims in forceare measured as the number
of previously granted patents that are maintained in the country. This measure is presented in the
last row of Table 1. The number of claims in force per capita is much higher in the USA (about 150
claims per 1000 capita) than in Japan and Europe, which are respectively at 60% and 10% of the
US level. This very low ratio for Europe is partly explained by a stricter selection process at the
EPO (van Pottelsberghe, 2010) and by the higher costs that follow the decision to grant a patent. In
particular, once a patent is granted it must be enforced in each desired country, implying translation
costs, validation fees and renewal fees in each desired country (van Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2010).
A second stylized fact is that examination fees are larger in Europe. Fees and examination
resources are presented in Table 2. The cumulated fees from the ling to the decision to grant a
patent6 are the most expensive in the E.U. and the cheapest in the USA and Japan. The cumulated
fees for an average patent are more than four times higher at the EPO than at the USPTO. This is
true whenever this charge is accrued per led patent or per led claim. For instance, the examination
of a patent led at the EPO would cost about USD 9,348 (more than USD 500 per claim), against
USD 2,325 at the JPO (USD 258 per claim) and USD 2,426 at the USPTO (USD 101 per claim).
Such di¤erences have persisted for a signicant period of time (de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe,
2008). In the E.U., additional translation costs into national languages and patent renewal fees in
national markets further increase the di¤erence in the rmscost for patent ling.
Because patent o¢ ces are "o¢ cially" non-prot organizations, the rmscost of ling patents can
also be assessed with the patent o¢ cesrevenues or budgets. Patent o¢ ces receive various payments
like ling fees, examination fees, renewal fees and ancillary procedures. The o¢ cesbudgets per led
patent or claim are higher than the cumulated examination fees because the former include renewal
6Cumulated fees include ling fees, search fees and grant fees (any fees that must be paid up to the grant of a
patent. The total budget is also composed of the renewal fees income, which explains why the budget per le is
higher than the cumulated fees per le in Japan and the US. At the EPO the budget per le (claim) is lower than the
cumulated fees per le (claims) because the EPO performs much more PCT searches (not all PCT applications are
transferred as regional applications), at a fee which does not compensate for the costs incurred (see Danguy and van
Pottelsberghe, 2010).
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fees and ancillary procedures. This is however less true for the EPO, which must process many
applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and which receives half the renewal fees
collected by national patent o¢ ces in Europe (Danguy and van Pottelsberghe, 2010). However, both
the fees per claim and budget per claim yield the conclusion that the EPO and the JPO allocate two
to three times more examination resources per patent or per claim than the USPTO. In other words,
the USPTO seems to allocate at least twice less resources to examination than the JPO or EPO.
2008, USD EPO JPO USPTO E.U./US JP/US
Cumulated fees per led patent 9,348 2,325 2,426 3.9 1.0
Cumulated fees per led claim 519 258 101 5.1 2.6
Budget per led patent 7,527 3,042 3,627 2.1 0.8
Budget per led claim 418 338 151 2.8 2.2
Table 2: Cumulated patent fees and o¢ ce budget per patent, 2008
Source: Own calculation from annual reports of patent o¢ ces, de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008) and van
Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2010).
A third stylized fact is that examiners at the USPTO process more patent applications than at
the EPO or JPO. This is shown in Table 3, which provides alternative measures of the workload
per examiner. The number of claims searched(search for prior art) per examiner, and the num-
ber of claims examined(examination for inventiveness) per examiner can be used as indicators of
examinersworkload and as very rough approximation of their productivity. The gures must take
into account the fact that in Japan the examiners do not perform the search report, which takes
at least 50% of the time of the average examiner at the USPTO and EPO. The equivalent work-
loadindicator, which adds the claims searched and the claims examined per examiner are similar in
Japan and Europe (between 1,400 and 1,700 claims per examiner each year), but is less than 50% the
workload of an average US examiner. In terms of claims granted, the average EPO (JPO) examiner
grantseach year 45% (79%) of the number of claims granted by the average USPTO examiner.7
7The JPO has a higher ratio than the EPO for granted patents partly because the grant rate of examination
requests is higher in Japan than in Europe. This is due to the fact that applicants in Japan have three years to request
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In a nutshell, be it in terms of incoming workload per examiner, or outgoing (granted claims per
examiner), the average USPTO examiner processes at least two times more patents or claims each
year than the average EPO or JPO examiner.
Workload per examiner EPO JPO USPTO E.U./US JP/US
Claims led (inc. PCT) 1055 2095 1776
Claims searched 1055 outsourced 1776 0,59 -
Claims examination request 642 1406 1776 0,36 0,79
Claims granted 278 857 613 0,45 1,40
Equivalent workload
(claims searched + examined) 1698 1406 3551 0,48 0,40
Table 3. Workload per examiner, 2008
Source: Own calculation from annual reports of patent o¢ ces and de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008) for
claim numbers.
The above measures of workload or productivity do not seem to be positively correlated with
incentives. Another fact is indeed that E.U. and Japanese patent o¢ ces o¤er more attractive com-
pensations to their examiners. In 2008, a typical USPTO examiner earns a civil servant GS12 (step
5) gross salary of about 87,000 USD with some 24% locality adjustments that are subject to federal
and state taxation.8 By contrast, the EPO o¤ers one of the most comprehensive and family-friendly
benets packages in Europe. The o¤er comprises an internationally competitive basic salary that
is exempt from national income tax. The 2009 gross salary for an A4 step 2 examiner (there are 7
grades under the President, and 13 steps per grade) is of about 120,000 EUR (or about 160,000 USD)
and is not subject to state taxation. In addition, EPO employees receive excellent social security
an examination, against 18 months at the EPO. This longer period leads to more stringent self-selection process in
Japan and hence to higher quality patents submitted for examination (see Yamauchi and Nagaoka, 2009). Since it
takes less time to grant a patent than to refuse it, examiner in Japan turn out to grant more patent each year.
8See http://www.popa.org/txt/salary2008.txt.
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coverage, medical insurance, and pension and saving plans and benet from several other attractive
allowances.9 In Japan a 35 years old examiner being married and having one child would earn more
than 7 million YEN (or 81,772 USD) per year, subject to taxation. He/she also receives insurance
packages and support for lodging expenses (through dormitories facilities or nancial allowance for
apartment rental, up to 334,000 YEN each year).
The variety in compensation packages makes comparisons di¢ cult. An alternative approach is
presented in Table 4, which compares each o¢ ces compensation budget and reports it in terms of the
numbers of examiners and total sta¤ (the sta¤/examiners ratio lies at about 1.65 in all o¢ ces). This
provides us with a higher and a lower bound for the examinersgross compensation packages. To
ease comparison, those bounds are presented in US PPPs. At the USPTO, the total compensation
per sta¤ of 106,272 US PPPs roughly corresponds to the gross salary mentioned above. Given that
the tax wedge is much smaller for the EPO examiners, the gures in Table 4 conrm the fact that
the EPO o¤ers much more attractive compensation packages than the USPTO. According to this
metric, it also seems to be the case for the Japan Patent O¢ ce, which devotes even more resources
per examiner than the EPO.
US PPPs, 2008 EPO JPO USPTO E.U./US JP/US
Tot. Compensation/examiner 286,514 342,914 167,052 1.72 2.05
Tot. Compensation/sta¤ 165,779 198,654 106,272 1.56 1.87
Table 4. Budget/incentive per examiner
Source: Own calculations from the annual reports of patent o¢ ces.
We may now attempt to draw some conclusions about the quality of the patent process. Com-
bining the above information, it is more convenient to measure patent quality through the inputs in
the patent o¢ ce: work time and on-the-job experience. In a perfect labor market, the fact that EPO
9The EPO o¤ers allowances for expatriation (16-20%), installation (a month salary), household (up to 6%), de-
pendent children, child education (international schools fees), learning languages (uency in English, French, German
and other languages is frequent).
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examiners process a smaller amount of patent applications and are better paid implies that EPO
gives more time and more incentives to their examiners and that it allows for a higher quality in the
patent examination process. This conclusion is corroborated by the sta¤ turnovers and job experi-
ence in each o¢ ce (van Pottelsberghe, 2010). Indeed, whereas the EPO and the JPO have a very
small sta¤ turnover, the USPTO has an annual sta¤ turnover of about 30% in 2008. Although this
di¤erence can be partly explained by more attractive compensation packages, it also gives evidence
of a much longer job experience of EPO or JPO examiners. This discussion may give ground to the
idea that the patents granted by the EPO are of a higher quality in the sense that their assessment
is made in a more rigorous way.
Higher compensations may arise from various reasons. Labor economics points out unionization
as an important cause of high wages. An important issue therefore relates to the examinerspotential
power on the decision process of their institution. The EPO is an international independent institu-
tion, whose sta¤ includes civil servants with an international status. As said before, sta¤ turnover
is low. Examiners have two forms of representations within the institution: the sta¤ committee that
has a consultative voice in the EPO board and the SUEPO union to which 50% of sta¤ adhere.
Contrary to the sta¤ committee, SUEPO is an independent institution that is well funded and takes
independent initiatives for study, publicity and negotiation. The union has participated in negoti-
ations on workerscompensation and has contributed to the public debate on patent quantity vs.
quality. Examiners have occasionally engaged in collective actions, for instance in 2006 against a new
examiner reporting system. The USPTO is an agency in the United States Department of Commerce
that employs examiners as national civil servants. Examiners are represented by the POPA union
(Patent O¢ ce Professional Association) that has negotiated on issues about tele-work, o¢ ces, and
equitable treatment. It currently negotiates the examiner current Performance Appraisal Plan and
is strongly interested in the discussion about quality so that quality measure looks at examiner
performance in a more realistic encompassing manner(POPA news June 2010 Vol. 10 No. 3, p. 2).
It is important to shortly discuss the mission and governance of patent o¢ ces. In most cases, the
patent o¢ cesmission statements are limited to commitments to appropriate framing of intellectual
13
property rights and to contribute to innovation, competitiveness and growth. The mission usually
includes administrative functions such as the search and examination process of patent disposals as
well as advisory functions to government ministries about intellectual property right. In this sense,
the o¢ ces can be seen as setting and justifying their objectives by themselves.
USPTO EPO JPO
Contract Domestic civil servant International civil servant Domestic civil servant
Union representation Sit on board
Tenured contracts Not before two years 6 month probation 6 months probation
Union organization POPA SUEPO Union of METI
Severance clauses YES YES YES
Unionization rate na 50% 23% in all METI
Personnel turnover 25-33% 3-5% 0-3%
Table 5. Governance and unions in patent o¢ ces
The governance structure has also implications on the formulation of the institutionsobjectives.
In particular, the EPO is an international organization directed by a board (called European Patent
Organization) that gathers representatives of national patent o¢ ces (or contracting States). As an
intergovernmental organization, the EPO is required to balance its budget because contracting States
are obliged (but reluctant) to nance any decit. The governance structure is prone to conict of
interest on the one hand because some national patent o¢ ces are somewhat competitors for patent
ling and on the other hand because national patent o¢ ces receive the proceeds of renewals of the
patents granted by the EPO. The board could therefore be criticized to favor quantity over quality
of patents because this strategy is expected to raise national patent o¢ ces revenues and maintain
their national demand for patents. Recently, the board has attempted to reduce the backlog and
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has promoted productivity measurement systems, by putting more pressure on the shoulders of
examiners.
The USPTO has a quite di¤erent governance structure. The USPTO is a federal agency of the
U.S. Department of Commerce that is fully funded by the fees since 1991. It is led by the Director
of the USPTO (who directly becomes Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property). This
person is appointed by the President (heard and conrmed by the US Senate) and directly reports
to the Secretary of Commerce. He/she is responsible for providing policy direction and management
supervision for the USPTO and for the issuance of patents and registration of trademarks. Since
1991, USPTO directors were outsiders of the USPTO and have changed according to the changes
in federal administrations. As a result, one may infer that USPTO directors are linked to current
federal administrations and their political agendas. Similarly, the JPO is an agency of the Japanese
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and is led by a commissioner.
To conclude, the above stylized facts establish that the EPO processes fewer patents and claims
per capita and per examiner, pays higher compensations and provides a better patent quality. The
purpose of the following sections is to frame the relationships between those features. Towards this
aim, we discuss a model of patent o¢ ce where examiners produce patents with a quality level that
a¤ects the agentscondence about the protection warranted by patents.
3 Model
In this model we assume a unique patent o¢ ce and a set of rms or individuals that have an invention
to patent and to potentially submit to the market place. Those agents enter into a ve period game.
In the rst period, the patent o¢ ce sets a (uniform) fee f 2 R+ and a quality standard for the
patent systems q 2 [0; 1]. The patent o¢ ce receives patent applications and asks its examiners to
investigate whether the inventions described in the applications are patentable (i.e., not obvious and
unknown in the existing body of knowledge, or"prior art"). We assume that it costs nothing to
deliver a patent with zero quality; that is, stamping, copying and archiving the application forms
involves no examination cost. It however costs more in term of examinersattention and training to
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check the obviousness and the inventive steps of patent applications. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the unit cost of a patent application does not depend on the number of applications that
are scrutinized by the patent o¢ ce. In this sense, there are constant returns to scale in the patent
examination process. This ts the fact that patent o¢ ces usually are "at" organizations with a few
hierarchy layers. We also assume constant returns to scale in quality. The patent o¢ ce requires l = q
(q  1) units of examinerstime to process a patent application. Hence, the unit cost to process a
patent application is equal to wl = wq where w is the examiners wage.
In the second period, a unit mass of rms is endowed with an invention each. Inventions di¤er
with respect to their specic inventiveness probability b 2 [0; 1], which captures the inherent and
idiosyncratic uncertainty that technical knowledge embodied in the invention is patentable, i.e. not
obvious and novel with respect to the existing knowledge (or "prior art) and that it has no close
substitute in any other technological elds. In other words, an invention has a strong inventiveness
probability b when it is very much likely to be recognized as patentable, or novel and inventive. In
particular an invention with b = 1 would be granted with probability one by an examiner who has
full knowledge, full expertise and innite time to process the patent le. An invention with b = 0
would be granted with zero probability by the same examiner. Following Friebel, et al. (2006, p.
22) one can relate the inventiveness probability to the breadth of an invention: "if one thinks of the
range of technologies and possible products in spatial terms, patent breadth refers to the territory
in this space over which the patent-holder has exclusive control". So, the inventiveness probability
is related to the ease to grasp the set of application elds for which the invention constitutes a prior
art. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the inventiveness b is uniformly distributed across
inventions. For the sake of conciseness and with some abuse of language we will shortly call b the
inventiveness. Each rm is uniquely determined by its inventiveness and can simply be indexed by
b.
In the third period, each rm chooses whether to apply for a patent in the patent o¢ ce. If it
does, the rm pays the patent application fee f plus a drafting cost c that corresponds to the cost
of collating and presenting the information on its invention in a format appropriate for the patent
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o¢ ce. The patent o¢ ce then examines the novelty and inventiveness of the proposed invention and
may decide whether to grant a patent or not. In practice, judging an invention is a complex process
and can be subject to assessment errors. In this paper we abstract from the modelling of information
processing (as is done in Caillaud and Duchêne, 2005; and in Langinier and Marcoul, 2003) and rather
focus on the governance structure of patent o¢ ces. Examiners are more likely to grant patents
to inventions with higher inventive step. Their search for prior art and examination are however
imperfect so that some signicant inventions may fail whereas some inventions with a weak degree of
inventiveness can successfully pass the patent examination process. For simplicity, we assume that
a rm with inventiveness b will have its patent granted with the probability p(q; b) = (1  q) + bq.
When the patent o¢ ce o¤ers no quality in delivering the patents (q = 0), all applications are patented
(p(0; b) = 1). The patent o¢ ce is just stamping and archiving the application. By contrast, when the
patent o¢ ce sets a higher quality level, it is more likely to grant patents to inventions with stronger
inventiveness. When it sets the maximal quality (q = 1), the probability of granting a patent is
strictly proportional to the inherent and idiosyncratic uncertainty b (p(1; b) = b).
In the subsequent time periods, the invention is developed, brought to the market and possibly
challenged by a competitor. We describe the subsequent events according to whether the rm has
applied for and/or has a patent granted. Suppose that the rm has its patent granted. In the fourth
period, the rm works on the product design and marketing strategy with some uncertainty. With
probability (1  ), the invention gets no market value. However, with probability , the invention
has a market value v = 1 and the rm enters in the last period. In the last time period, the rm
is able to collect the value v = 1 of its invention in the product market only with some probability
(1   ). By contrast, with probability , it faces a potential competitor who challenges the rms
ownership over its invention. There are many ways to challenge existing patents. The challenger
may hold a patent that includes technical knowledge that precedes or is close to patented invention
b; it may hold a patent that pertains to an application eld unrelated to patent b; or it may not
hold any patent and claim that the patent is simply not valid. In any case, the main reason of the
contention lies in the patent o¢ ces di¢ culty of ascertaining the exact inventiveness of the invention.
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Nevertheless, in this setup, higher quality patent systems deliver more accurate information about
inventiveness. The only way to solve this challenge is to go to court (or negotiate) with a bunch of
lawyers. Importantly we assume that the judge (or jury) is sensitive to the quality of the patent
system q and is more likely to settle the case in favor of the rm holding the patent when the patent
system is reputed to have high quality. For instance, Fisher (2010) observes that in German Courts
there is a lower probability to challenge patent validity when it is delivered by the EPO, as opposed
to those granted by other patent o¢ ces. Hence, patent quality translates to patent strength as in
Farrell and Shapiro (2005); stronger patents are more likely to be validated in Court. Also, the judge
(or jury) is sensitive to the clarity, x, of the explanations delivered by challenged rms lawyers whose
costs are given by the quadratic function x2=(2). The lawyer cost is therefore inversely proportional
to the parameter . For the sake of analytical tractability, we assume that the judge (jury) grants
a winning case to the patent holder with a probability equal to P (q; x) = x
p
(1 + q) =2. Hence, the
patented rm receives more protection when it receives a patent of higher quality. Note that the set
of three parameters (; ; ) reect the elements of Lemleys rational ignorance principle. Patented
inventions may have a high probability of being associated with a large market value (high ), a high
probability to be challenged (high ) and high trial costs in case of contentions (low ).
Suppose on the other hand that the rm has been refused a patent or has not applied for a patent.
The rm faces the same events as before except that its probability to win a challenge case is smaller.
In the fourth period, the rm gets a market value v = 1 with probability  and enters in the last
period where, with probability , it faces a potential competitor who challenges the ownership over
its invention. Since it holds no patent, the judge (or jury) grants a winning case to the rm with
a probability equal to P (0; x) = x
p
1=2. Hence, the rm receives less protection when it does not
receive or apply for a patent.
In the following sections, we rst determine the demand for patent examination and then discuss
the production of patents by patent o¢ ces according to various governance structures. We nally
study the case of a unionized patent o¢ ce.
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4 Demand for patents
Let the fee and the quality of a patent be denoted by f and q. We solve the above game backward.
In the last period, the rm can face a challenge over the ownership of its invention. The rm has
a product market value v = 1 and selects the optimal e¤ort x in lawyers that maximizes its expected
prot 1  P (q; x)   x2=(2). The optimal e¤ort is x = p1 + q=p2 and yields an expected prot
of  (1 + q) =4. Hence, before the possibility of a challenge over ownership, the rm has an expected
prot of (1 )+ (1 + q) =4. When the rm holds no patent for its invention, it gets a prot equal
to the latter expression where q is set to zero. In the fourth period, the rm has a probability  to
develop the market value v for its invention. So, before the realization of this event the expected
prot is equal to V (q)   [(1  ) +  (1 + q) =4].
In the third period, the rm may le a patent. A rm with inventiveness b receives a patent with
the probability p(q; b) and has an expected prot equal to p(q; b)V (q) + (1   p(q; b))V (0)   (f + c)
when it les an application, whereas it gets V (0) when it does not. The rm b applies for a patent
if the former prot is larger; that is, if
p(q; b) [V (q)  V (0)]  (f + c) () b  eb   1  q
q
+
1
a
f + c
q2
;
where
a  1
4
:
The rm indi¤erent to apply for a patent has an inventiveness equal to eb. The parameter a measures
the net benet of holding a patent. It increases with larger probabilities of a successful market reach
(higher ), with stronger likelihood of being challenged (higher ), and with smaller lawyerscost
(higher ).
For the sake of simplicity it is now assumed that
c > a=4: (1)
This assumption implies that the drafting cost c is always above the expected value of the invention
with zero degree of inventiveness (b = 0). Under this assumption, we get that f + c > aq(1   q)
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for all (f; q), that is, eb > 0 for all (f; q) : This assumption allows us to avoid corner solutions in the
demand function. Hence, any rm holding an invention with higher inventiveness than eb applies for
a patent. One then readily derives the following demand for patents:
D(f; q) = max

0;
1
q

1  f + c
aq

:
This demand for patents (or the number of patent applications) increases with smaller patent fees
(f). It increases in q if q < 2 (c+ f) =a: The above expression has an intuitive interpretation. The
term 1=q in front of the parentheses relates to the screening e¤ort performed by the patent o¢ ce. A
higher quality of the patent system implies a smaller probability of receiving a patent and therefore
decreases the number of patent applications. By contrast, the term aq in the parenthesis relates
to the expected benet from patent protection. A higher quality in the patent system increases
this protection and therefore the number of patent applications. The demand for patents therefore
increases with larger net benet of holding a patent a. Indeed, the demand increases with larger
a, i.e., with larger success probabilities of marketing inventions and fewer challenges and smaller
lawyerscosts.
The impact of the patent systems quality is also easy to understand by observing the inverse
demand function F :
F (D; q)  aq (1 Dq)  c
where D is the number of patent applications. The rm with the largest inventiveness (b = 1)
has the highest willingness to pay the fee in exchange of an examination: F (0; q) = qa   c. This
willingness to pay increases with the quality of the patent system. Indeed, when q rises, this rm
benets from both the rise in the probability of getting a patent and the better protection against
future competitorschallenges. By contrast, the rm with the lowest inventiveness (b = 0) has a
willingness to pay equal to F (1; q) = aq (1  q)  c < 0. This rm never applies for a patent. Firms
with intermediate inventiveness have a willingness to pay, aq(1  q)  c, which increases for small q
and then decreases for high q. They therefore face a trade-o¤: when the quality of the patent system
rises at small levels (small q), applying for a patent becomes more valuable because it o¤ers more
20
protection. However, when the quality is large and rises (large q), applying for a patent becomes less
valuable because the patent o¢ ce is more likely to discriminate against their inventions.
Finally, we derive the (expected) number of patents granted by the patent o¢ ce:
B(f; q) 
Z 1
eb p(q; b)db =
1
2q
"
1 

f + c
aq
2#
:
The number of patents granted is then a decreasing function of the fees f . Note that B(f; q) <
D(f; q).
5 Production of patents
The budget of the patent o¢ ce is given by its prot, i.e., its revenues minus its costs. Formally,
(f; q) = D(f; q) (f   wq) :
It is worth discussing three benchmark organizations of patent o¢ ces. The rst organization is
controlled by a social planner, the second by a prot maximizing manager and the third by politicians
who maximize either the number of patent applications or the number of patents granted. In a nal
stage the impact of labor unions is investigated.
5.1 Social optimum
Suppose that the quality is chosen by a social planner who maximizes the aggregate net surplus from
the patent system.10 The planner knows each rms inventiveness parameter b and takes the judicial
system as given. Let the index function (b) 2 f1; 0g indicate whether the rm b is admitted to
apply for a patent. The social planner chooses the index function (b) and quality q that maximize
the following aggregate net surplus:
W =
Z 1
0
(b) fp(q; b)V (q) + (1  p(q; b))V (0)  wq   cg+ (1  (b))V (0)db
10Note that lump sum transfers (subsidy or tax) are permitted to the patent o¢ ce.
21
where the social cost per application is equal to the sum of labor cost wq and drafting cost c. The
optimal number of applications implies that (b) = 1 if and only if
p(q; b) [V (q)  V (0)]  wq + c () b  bo   1  q
q
+
w
aq
+
c
aq2
:
By assumption (1), bo > 0. Note also that the cut-o¤ bo decreases in q for any bo  1. Using the
value of () and bo and using the denition of p and V , we get
W =
1
2a
(a  w   c=q)2 ;
which increases in quality q. So, the socially optimal quality is the corner solution:
qo = 1:
The social planner chooses to implement the highest quality for the patent o¢ ce and therefore does not
add any noise in the examination process. This is because examination costs obliges her to screen
out inventions with low inventiveness. The o¢ ce then examines the inventions that have larger
inventiveness and therefore higher benets from quality. Indeed, a rm bs marginal benet from a
quality increase is equal to @
@q
fp(q; b) [V (q)  V (0)]g = 1 + 2 (b  1) q, which is larger for higher b.
Because inventions with larger inventiveness bring larger welfare improvements from a same quality
increase and reputation of the patent o¢ ce, the planner is enticed to rise the quality to its maximal
level.
The socially optimal number of patent applications is
Do = 1  bo = a  (w + c)
a
:
The socially optimal (expected) number of patents granted is given by
Bo 
Z 1
bo
p(qo; b)db =
Z 1
bo
bdb =
1
2
"
1 

w + c
a
2#
:
There will be a non zero mass of rms applying for patents if a > w + c. For the sake of simplicity
it is now assumed that the socially optimal number of patent applications is positive. That is,
a > w + c: (2)
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This condition guarantees that the cost of processing the application of the rm with the highest
inventiveness is lower than the value of its invention.
Two additional remarks are worth it. First, the social planner has the possibility to decentralize
this allocation by setting a fee such that the demand for patent examination is equal to its socially
optimal level: D(f; qo) = Do. This implies that f o = qow = w; and the patent o¢ ce makes no
positive prot on applications. Because the o¢ ce has constant returns to scale, the social planners
decision is both an unconstrained optimum and a budget constrained optimum for quality. Second, in
this model, we do not focus on the discrepancy between private value and social value of inventions
frequently emphasized in the patent literature. Adding such a discrepancy in the present model
would increase the planners value of invention to a (a > a) and would therefore give incentives to
maintain the top quality of patent system qo = 1. It would also raise further the socially optimal
number of examinations to [a  (w + c)] =a above the demand Do so that the examination fee should
be set below its cost and the o¢ ce should be subsidized. However, most patent o¢ ces seem to adopt
the constraint of budget neutrality.
5.2 Prot oriented patent o¢ ce
We here suppose that the patent o¢ ce is delegated to a private rm (or manager) that maximizes
the o¢ ces prot. Although there exists no example of such a prot oriented patent o¢ ce, it is
instructive to discuss the optimal quality chosen by such an organization
Let the patent o¢ ce maximize
(f; q) = D(f; q) (f   wq) :
For any quality q, the optimal fee is fm = 1
2
(aq + qw   c). The demand for patent examina-
tion is then D(fm; q) = (aq   wq   c) =(2aq2) which is positive if a > w + c=q. The prot then
writes as (fm; q) = (a  w   c=q)2 = (4a), which increases in q for any positive demand. The
monopolys maximizing quality is then equal to qm = 1. The number of applications is equal to
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Dm = (a  w   c) = (2a) and the expected number of patents granted is equal to
Bm =
1
2
"
1 

1
2
c+ a+ w
a
2#
:
Like the social planner, the prot maximizing o¢ ce sets the highest quality level and therefore
does not add any noise on the examination process. The rationale is somewhat di¤erent. The o¢ ce
here targets rms with strong inventiveness because they are willing to pay high fees. Since the
willingness to pay of these rms increases with patent quality, the o¢ ce has an incentive to raise
quality too. Of course the prot oriented o¢ ce sets a higher fee and therefore receives a smaller
number of patent applications and grants fewer patents. It is indeed readily shown that Dm < Do
and Bm < Bo so that the numbers of patents led and granted are socially too small. To sum up,
the ine¢ ciency with the prot maximizing patent o¢ ce originates from its too high fees and not from
its quality.
5.3 Self-funded patent o¢ ces
Most patent o¢ ces are self-nanced. An unresolved issue is what objectives patent o¢ ce follow
after they have balanced their budget. As discussed in Section 2, patent o¢ ces are governments
agencies run by politically linked managers. One may therefore assume that patent o¢ ces could
follow politician objectives. Politicians often assess and praise the e¤ectiveness of patent systems
by the numbers of patent applications or/and by the number of granted patents. First, these two
numbers are obvious measurable outcomes of each patent o¢ ce for which politicians are accountable
to the public. Second, these two numbers are measures of the country and industrial inventiveness,
which politicians often like to praise. Third, the rate of inventions has recently sharply increased in
some sectors. Policy makers have therefore recommended to promote a certain form of quality of
servicein order to fasten examination processes and thus increase the number of patents granted.
Finally, in Section 2, we noted that EPOs governance structure is biased towards rewarding national
patent o¢ ces. The EPO board includes representatives of the national patent o¢ ces, which collect
the proceeds from renewals of patents granted by the EPO. The EPO board has thus some incentives
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to raise the number of granted patents. The impact of those objectives on the quality of the patent
systems is illustrated in this section.
On the one hand, suppose that the o¢ ces follow a politician objective to increase the number of
patent applications. The budget balance condition implies that the fees should be set to cover the
examination cost so that f = wq. The politiciansoptimal quality and fee are computed as follows.
The o¢ ces maximize
D(wq; q) = max

0;
1
q

1  w
a
  c
aq

:
The second term in the bracket reaches a maximum at q = 2c= (a  w). So, the optimal quality is
qD =
8><>:
2c
a w if
2c
a w  1
1 if 1 < 2c
a w  2
(3)
and the number of patent applications is
DD =
8><>:
1
4
(a w)2
ac
if 2c
a w  1
1  w
a
  c
a
if 1 < 2c
a w  2
whereas if 2c
a w > 2, the number of applications is nil and the quality undened. The (expected)
number of patents granted by the patent o¢ ce:
BD = B(wqD; qD) =
8><>:
a w
4c

1 

(a w)(f+c)
2ac
2
if 2c
a w  1
1
2
h
1   f+c
a
2i
if 1 < 2c
a w  2
:
The above expressions allow us to draw three conclusions. First, even though a politician oriented
management does not formally value the quality of the patent system, it implements a positive quality.
This is because a better quality increases the rmsvalue of a patent examination through a lower
uncertainty associated with their intellectual rights protection. The o¢ ce indeed needs to set a low
enough quality to help applicants to pass through the examination procedure but at the same time
it needs to set a high enough quality to insure a good reputation for the patent o¢ ce and a better
patent judicial protection. Second, the o¢ ce raises its quality for higher personnel costs w. Higher
costs induce the o¢ ce to raise its fees and to lose some demand; to compensate this loss, the o¢ ce
raises its quality. This is an important result: higher personnel costs is correlated with the quality
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of patent system even though the o¢ ces management puts no formal weight on quality. Finally, the
patent o¢ ce raises its quality if the external drafting cost c rises. Additional drafting costs diminish
the rmsdemand for patent examination and entices the o¢ ce to raise its quality to compensate
for this loss.
On the other hand, suppose that the patent o¢ ces follow an objective measured by the number of
granted patents. This setup might correspond to the incentives structure of the EPO board. Under
this objective, the o¢ ce maximizes
B(wq; q)  1
2q
 
1 

w
a
+
c
aq
2!
so that an increase in quality would lead to more patents being granted if and only if
d
dq
B(wq; q)  0 ()    a2   w2 q2 + 4cwq + 3c2  0:
The last polynomial is concave and has a unique positive root. This condition yields the following
optimal quality
qB = min

c
a2   w2

2w +
p
3a2 + w2

; 1

: (4)
Interestingly, this expression allows us to draw the same conclusions as before: qB > 0; dqB=dw > 0
and dqB=dc > 0. Under this objective, the o¢ ce has an incentive to reduce its quality to zero and
to grant patents to any invention application. Yet, a zero quality strategy is not optimal because it
eliminates any value for patents by exacerbating the uncertainty in the intellectual rights protection.
To attract rms, the o¢ ce must implement some positive quality. Similarly, higher examinerscosts
entice the o¢ ce to raise its fees and to compensate for the demand loss by a higher quality. Finally,
the quality reached under this objective is nevertheless lower. Indeed, it is easy to check that qB  qD.
The o¢ ce prefers to lower the quality in order to supply more patents even though the latter are less
attractive to rms. Also, since DD = maxqD(wq; q) and BB = maxq B(wq; q), we naturally have
that DD  DB and BD  BB.
The quality and the numbers of patent applications and granted patents can readily be compared
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for the above benchmark organizations:
qB  qD  qo = qm = 1;
Dm < Do  DD and DB  DD;
Bm < Bo  BB and BD  BB:
We can similarly rank the patent fees. Because fB = wqB  fD = wqD  f o = w and fm =
(a+ w   c)=2 > w by (2), we get the following inequalities:
fB  fD  f o < fm:
So, the fees are obviously the highest in the o¢ ce that freely maximizes prots and the smallest in
the o¢ ce with a governor that maximizes the number of granted patents. It must be noted that fees
can be equal to its social optimal value f o = w when the o¢ ce governor has incentives to raise the
quality to its highest level qB = qD = 1.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The quality of a patent system is maximal for the social planner and monopoly patent
o¢ ce, is smaller for the self-funded patent o¢ ce maximizing the number of patent applications and
even smaller for the self-funded patent o¢ ce maximizing the number of granted patents. The number
of applications is smaller in the monopoly patent o¢ ce than in the social planners o¢ ce and larger
in the self-funded patent o¢ ce maximizing the number of patent applications.
We now turn to a perhaps more realistic organization of patent o¢ ce.
5.4 Unionized Patent O¢ ces
In this section we assume that the patent o¢ ce is run by a governor that follows a politician objective.
However, examiners in the patent o¢ ce are organized in a (single) union that makes claims on wages.
Unionization can easily be understood in the context of a patent o¢ ce because it is usually the sole
employer of highly trained professionals. In particular, when an o¢ ce like the EPO is set up as an
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international institution, employees are put away from national labor contract laws and customs and
are likely to ask for more protection and exert more pressure on the institution. Hence, the power of
insiders is likely to be increased and their wages pushed up. In Section 2, we presented some factual
evidence of the existence and the power of the union of patent o¢ ces in Europe, Japan and the USA.
In this section we argue that insiderspower is an important element determining the quality of a
patent system, in particular, in the E.U. We show that a larger power of insiders raises not only
wages but also the quality of the patent o¢ ce. The objectives of o¢ cesmanagement are not clearly
dened in practice. We therefore focus on the hypothetical but relevant objectives of increasing the
number of patent applications and increasing the number of patents granted.
5.4.1 Governor maximizing the number of patent applications
We assume Nash bargaining between the union and the politician oriented governor. The governor
maximizes the number of patent applications, D(f; q); while he/she maintains the patent o¢ ce at a
break even situation. As before, the production of patents is subject to constant returns to quality
so that the number of examiners per patent application is equal to l = q and the unit cost per
application is equal to wq where w is the examinerswage. So, the number of examiners is clearly
linked to the quality of the patent system. We further assume that the union seeks to increase the
examinersincome w over an outside (fallback) wage w (e.g. their wage in the industry). For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the value of a patent is larger than examining cost for the highest
quality standard. That is, we impose that a > w + c.
Under right to manage, the o¢ ce has the right to hire the examiners after wages are negotiated
and set. After the wage negotiation, the self-nanced o¢ ce must set a fee that reimburses the cost
of an examination: f = wq. Because of constant returns to scale to quality, the total number of
examiners is equal to l D(f; q) = q D(wq; q). The o¢ ce then sets the quality q that maximizes
the number of applications D(wq; q). At the wage bargaining stage, the o¢ ce seeks to maximize the
same objective whereas the union seeks to maximize the wage bill qDD(wqD; qD) given the examiners
outside wage w. Let  be the bargaining power of the examinersunion. Then, the outcome of the
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negotiation process is given by the Nash bargaining solution
max
w
N = max
w

(w   w) qDD(wqD; qD) D(wqD; qD)1  s.t. qD = max
q
D(wq; q):
Two regimes occur according to whether the quality is maximal or not after the negotiation.
Suppose rst that 2c=(a   w) < 1 so that the quality chosen by the o¢ ce is qD = 2c=(a   w). The
demand for examination is D(wqD; qD) = (a  w)2 =(4ac). Then, after some algebra and using the
envelop theorem, the rst order condition of the above program simplies to
d lnN
dw
=
d
dw

 ln

(w   w) qD+ lnD(wqD; qD)	
= 
d ln (w   w)
dw
+ 
d ln qD
dw
+ qD
@ lnD
@f
: (5)
The last expression shows the trade-o¤ between wage and quality. The rst two terms represent
the positive e¤ect of wage negotiation on earnings and on the number of examiners. The last term
reects the negative e¤ect of a wage increase on the demand for patent rights. This does not only
reduce the objective of the o¢ ce but also that of the union since budget neutrality imposes to reduce
the number of examiners if demand falls. In some sense, the o¢ ce and union agree on the principle
of increasing demand for patents.
After some lines of computations, the above expression simplies further to
d lnN
dw
=

w   w  
2  
a  w;
which decreases in w and has a zero at the bargained wage
w = w +
1
2
 (a  w)
so that the optimal quality is given by
q =
2c
a  w =
4c
(2  ) (a  w) :
As a result, the wage and the quality increases with the bargaining power of union. The quality is
equal to the one obtained in the case of a self-funded o¢ ce for  = 0 or for wage w = w (see (3)).
Quality increases above this level as the union power increases. We know from the previous section
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that even though a politician oriented management does not formally value the quality of the patent
system, it implements a positive quality to maintain the rmsvalue of a patent examination and
it raises quality for higher personnel costs. By putting an upward pressure on personnel costs, the
union contributes to a further rise in quality. Finally note that the condition 2c < a  w becomes
c < (2  ) (a  w) =4:
This condition and condition (1) form a non empty set if a=w > (2  ) = (1  ).
Suppose that 2c  a   w so that qD = 1 and D(w; 1) = 1   w=a   c=a. Then, the rst order
condition of this program is
d lnN
dw
=
d
dw
f ln [(w   w)] + lnD(w; 1)g = d ln (w   w)
dw
+
@ lnD
@f
: (6)
This equation shows the same e¤ects of a wage increase on the unions objective and the patent
o¢ ce as discussed for condition (5). Ceteris paribus, higher wages benet the union but increase
the o¢ ces operating costs and fees, and hence reduce the number of patent applications. Simple
computations yield
d lnN
dw
=

w   w  
1
a  w   c;
which decreases in w and has a zero at
w =
w +  (a  c)
1 + 
and q = 1:
So, the wage increases with the bargaining power of union for all cases with positive demand for
patents DD > 0. The condition 2c  a  w becomes
  (a  w   2c) =c:
Proposition 2 Consider a unionized patent o¢ ce managed by governors who maximize the number
of patent applications under the right to manage. Then, the quality and the wage (weakly) increase
with the bargaining power of the union. The quality is maximal if and only if the union bargaining
power is su¢ ciently large:   (a  w   2c) =c.
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As for the monopoly patent o¢ ce, this o¢ ce may implement the socially optimal quality. This
situation occurs if the union bargaining power is su¢ ciently large. In this case, the patent o¢ ce
obeys to the unions objective to maximize its rent by setting higher fees so that to attract rms
with the strongest inventiveness. To augment the number of such rms, the union has an incentive
to set the highest possible quality.
5.4.2 Governor maximizing the number of patents granted
We now study the case of a patent o¢ ce run by a politician oriented governor who maximizes the
expected number of granted patents and who negotiates with the examinersunion. Let again the
governor run the patent o¢ ce under the right to manage. Given that the break even constraint
imposes that the fee f equals the application processing cost wq, the bargaining outcome is the
solution of
max
w
N = (w   w) qBD(wqB; qB) B(wqB; qB)1  where qB = max
q
B(wq; q):
The quality level qB is given by condition (4) where dqB=dw > 0. Suppose that qB < 1. Then the
rst order condition can be written as
d lnN
dw
= 
d ln (w   w)
dw
+ 
d ln qB
dw
+ qB
@ lnD
@f
+ (1  )

@ lnB
@f
  @ lnD
@f

+ 
d
dq
lnD(wqB; qB)
dqB
dw
= 0: (7)
It is not possible to obtain a close form solution for this problem. However, we can infer the
direction of the bargained wage from this expression. The rst line of expression (7) is the same as
the expression in the wage setting equation (5). The two terms of the second line of expression (7)
introduces two new e¤ects. The rst term embeds a correction for the objective of this politician
oriented governor. One can check that
@ lnB
@f
  @ lnD
@f
=
1
aq + c+ f
 0:
Because of the break-even constraint, a wage increase raises the patent fee and therefore decreases the
expected number of granted patents; but it decreases the latter less than the number of applications.
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So, this governor is more inclined to keep fees and wages high. The second term embeds the impact
of wages on the number of patent applications and thus demand for examinerslabor. Higher wages
entice this governor to increase both quality and fees, which have opposite e¤ects on labor demand.
From the previous analysis we know that, at a given wage, the governor sets a lower quality if he/she
maximizes the expected number of granted patents rather than the number of patent applications.
Also, when the quality is low enough, the number of patent applications increases with higher quality
because patents o¤er better legal protections. It turns out that, under this governors objective, the
number of patent applications raises more with increased quality than it falls with increased fees.
Indeed, since, at a given w, qB  qD = arg maxqD(wq; q), we have that ddq lnD(wqB; qB)  0.
Hence, the two terms in the second line of expression (7) are positive. The wage bargained with this
governor, w; is therefore larger than the wage, w, bargained with a governor that maximizes the
number of patent applications.
Finally, suppose that qB = 1. Then, the rst order condition becomes
d lnN
dw
= 
d ln (w   w)
dw
+ 
@ lnD
@f
+ (1  )

@ lnB
@f
  @ lnD
@f

:
This expression is larger than condition (6) because the last term is positive. Again, the bargained
wage w must be larger in the o¢ ce run by a governor that maximizes the expected number of granted
patents than by the one that maximizes the number of patent applications.
Proposition 3 Consider a unionized patent o¢ ce managed by governors under the right to manage.
Then, the examinerswage is larger in the o¢ ce that is run by a governor who maximizes the number
of granted patents compared to the one who maximizes the number of patent applications.
So, this governor permits higher wages w > w. Numerical examples suggests that it still sets
lower quality qB(w) < qD(w).
6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between the quality of patent systems and
the governance of patent o¢ ces. The paper rstly establishes some stylized facts about the major
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patent o¢ ces in the U.S., E.U. and Japan. As a case in point, the E.U. patent o¢ ce processes fewer
patents and claims - in per capita and per examiner -, pays higher compensations to examiners and
devotes more resources per sta¤ that potentially contribute to a better patent quality. The stylized
facts suggest that compensation packages and union power are discriminating elements of patent
o¢ ce behaviors. Also, while patent o¢ ces can inuence their own targets, they are managed by
politically driven governors who must fund the o¢ ces with their resources and must interact with
examinersorganizations (unions). Although patent o¢ ces are managed under di¤erent contexts and
constraints, their objectives -be they explicit or implicit - most probably include the maximization
of a combination of the numbers of patent applications or the number of granted patents.
The paper then presents a model that describes the potential behaviors of patent o¢ ces with
respect to the setting of their fees and the quality of their examination processes. These fee/quality
settings depend on the four alternative objectives that patent o¢ cesgovernors may target, namely,
welfare, patent o¢ ces prot, number of patent applications and number of patents granted. The
paper also analyzes the behavior of governors who follow the last two objectives but negotiate the
wage conditions with examinersunions. As a point of departure, we assume that the patent system
quality is important for patent holders. A patent is viewed as a probabilisticproperty right that gives
the patent holder the right to sue potential infringers and a fair chance either to win the litigation in
court or to reach a favorable agreement. Therefore, a higher quality in patent examination lowers the
transaction costs associated with enforcement of intellectual property rights and increases the demand
for patents. The quality of the patent system contributes to the credibility of the patent certication
process and hence to the private value of and the demand for patents by rms. Finally, the model
includes elements of Lemleys rational ignorance principle. We indeed model the aftermath of patent
examinations, where patents have uncertain market opportunities and a probability to be challenged
by a competitor and to win in Court with some cost.
The results of the theoretical model rstly show that the demand for patent examination increases
with smaller patent fees but is a non-monotone function of the patent system quality. Indeed, a higher
quality patent system implies a more rigorous selection of the inventions submitted by rms and a
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better enforcement of granted patents in the judicial system. Whereas the latter e¤ect is good for
all innovators, the former e¤ect is bad for the innovators with smallinventions and reduces their
incentives to apply for a patent. Hence, whatever its objective, a self-funded patent o¢ ce faces a
trade-o¤ between softer examination and better credibility of the granted patents. The question
is whether the governors and examiners have incentives to soften the examination process and add
noise on the quality of the patent system.
We review four types of governorsobjective. First, we study the hypothetical but interesting
cases of an o¢ ce maximizing either the social welfare or its prots. We show that this o¢ ce chooses a
high quality level and therefore does not add any noise on the examination process. The o¢ ce targets
rms with strong inventiveness because those rms are willing to pay high fees. Since the willingness
to pay of those rms increases with patent quality, the o¢ ce has incentives raise the quality too. The
prot oriented o¢ ce sets a higher fee and therefore receives a smaller number of patent applications
and grants fewer patents. Second, we study the case of a self-funded o¢ ce where the governor
maximizes the number of patent applications. Policy makers sometimes praise themselves for this
number as a measure of either patent o¢ ce attractiveness or global level of economic activity. We
show that, even though this governor does not formally value the quality of the patent system, it
implements a positive quality level because a more rigorous patent examination process reduces the
degree of uncertainty associated with the e¤ective enforcement of the intellectual property rights. The
o¢ ce indeed decides to set a low enough quality to help applicants to pass through the examination
procedure but at the same time needs to set a high enough quality to insure a good reputation for
the patent o¢ ce and a better patent judicial protection. We also show that higher examinerswages
(or resources devoted to the examination process) increase with the quality of patent systems; even
though the o¢ ces management puts no formal weight on quality. Finally, we study the situation
in which the governor maximizes the number of patents granted, supposedly an indicator of good
functioning of the patent o¢ ce and the economy. Under this objective, the o¢ ce has an incentive
to reduce its quality to zero and to grant patents to any patent application. Yet, for the reason
stated before, a zero quality strategy is not optimal because it eliminates any value for patents
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by exacerbating the uncertainty in the intellectual rights protection. Comparing those four cases we
show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the rst best patent o¢ ce (i.e., maximizing
social welfare) and in monopoly patent o¢ ce, is smaller for the self-funded patent o¢ ce maximizing
the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent o¢ ce maximizing the
number of granted patents. By contrast, the number of applications is smaller in the monopoly
patent o¢ ce than in the social optimum o¢ ce and larger in the self-funded patent o¢ ce maximizing
the number of patent applications.
We nally study the impact of the examinersunion power in patent o¢ cesdecision making
processes. Unions have many times lobbied and exerted power not only about compensation issues
but also about quality issues. As a higher examination quality necessitates a larger workforce, it is
not surprising that unions promote better patent quality. We show that when the governor seeks
to maximize the number of patent applications, both examinerswage and patent quality increases
as unions get more power. Even though a politician oriented management does not formally value
the quality of the patent system, it implements a positive quality to maintain the rmsvalue of
a patent examination and raises quality to compensate for higher personnel costs. The union puts
an upward pressure on personnel costs and, as a consequence, contributes further to the increase in
patent quality. Unions therefore balance the politically oriented governorsincentives to cut on the
quality of patent systems. As in the case of the prot maximizing o¢ ce, this nevertheless occurs at
the cost of too high fees. Finally, the model suggests that incentives to raise examiners wage are
even stronger for a governor who maximizes the number of granted patents.
The present paper addresses the issue of patent quality from the perspective of the patent o¢ ces
behaviors and organizations. It deliberately abstracts from the other - no less relevant - issues covered
in the past and recent patent literature such as optimal length, scope and breadth. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the literature has not properly covered the relationship between the o¢ ces
organization and the e¤ective quality of the patent systems. Our main result is that o¢ ces o¤ering
high compensation packages like the EPO are likely to keep a high patent system quality whereas
o¢ ces o¤ering lower compensation packages like the USPTO have incentives to soften examination
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process and introduce noise in the patent system, with the consequence of having more patent
led and granted. The presence of organized labor (union) fosters the patent system quality and
compensates for the potential inappropriate objectives of patent o¢ ce management.
The discussion and results presented in this paper have their own limitations as many additional
features of patent systems have not been taken into account. The reality is indeed somewhat di¤erent
and much more complex than suggested in our stylized model. Compensation packages, fee settings,
budget components and even quality are composed of many facets that cannot be tackled in one
model.11 However, examiners must be managed, their wage must be set, and they have some right to
be heard. Last but not least, patent o¢ cesgovernors must set priorities that implicitly or explicitly
relate to the number of patent lings or patents granted. In the light of the stylized facts presented
in this paper, it seems that the EPO gets closer to the model where the governor maximizes the
number of patent lings and bargain examinerslabor conditions with a strong union (its strength
being implicitly linked to the status of international civil servants, who have secured positions). The
USPTO seems closer to the model of a patent o¢ ce that maximizes the number of patent granted.
This paper does not only o¤er a grid of analysis for existing patent o¢ ces but it also provides evidence
about the relationship between, on the one hand, the governance of patent o¢ ces (including their
strategic objectives and the role of examinersunions) and, on the other hand, the quality of patent
systems, its cost and the demand for patents.
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